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Abstract

A system architecture concept that suppons automation of small satellite mission
operations functions is presented along with a working prototype. The concept
and prototype provide an automation framework which enables much more advanced levels of operational autonomy than is typical of current systems. This
scalable architecture provides a risk mitigating stepwise approach toward achieving high levels of operational autonomy to enable significant operations cost savings through mission performance management by exception. The prototype consists of an October 1997 manifested Space Shuttle Hitchhiker payload along with
the software and hardware described in this paper.

Introduction
Future generations of satellites and deep space probes
must be considerably more operable and autonomous to
enable continuing exploration, science investigation, and
commercial utilization of space. The need for greater
operability and autonomy stems from shrinking governmental budgets to support scientific planetary exploration
missions, commercial interest in deploying large constellations of communications and imaging satellites, and the
scientific goals to globally survey the earth. Greatly decreased operations costs will not only enable more scientific missions, but will also enable operations systems to
be scalable to meet commercial goals such as operating
hundreds of communications satellites in low earth orbit
constellations [1 J.
Traditionally, teleoperated satellites include some automated functions both onboard and in the ground seg-

ment of operations; however, the human attention required for performance maintenance, resource management and planning alone still remains fairly high. Furthermore, the data rate associated with most low earth orbit satellites has increased rapidly over the past twenty
years such that human monitoring of telemetry is becoming less feasible (due to information overload). At the
same time, advances in sensor technology, actuator technology, intelligent interfaces, science instruments, and
embedded microprocessors have also made higher levels of automation much more feasible [6]. Unfortunately,
many of the functions which could be automated are not
automated due to many unique factors of the satellite industry and environment compared to commercial computer operating systems. These factors include relatively
infrequent usage, missions with large operational budgets, a risk-adverse culture, lack of competition, small

scale deployment, and novel aspects of the space environment.
Some of the factors which have contributed to a lack
of mission operations automation are in fact no longer
significant or existent today, yet the level of automation .
of mission operations has not changed dramatically. A
typical mission operations team for a scientific or commercial payload in low earth orbit would include tens of
operators fulfilling functions such as telemetry monitoring, planning, scheduling, resource management, performance analysis, anomaly resolution, navigation and maneuver planning. Much of this operator workload is not
directly related to mission goals or the payload and is simply an artifact of operational systems which cannot be
evolved to incorporate higher levels of automation over
the life of a single mission, over a number of missions,
within a scalable embedded system, or within a constellation of satellites.
Most mission operations concepts include nearly continuous explicit human monitoring from centralized control centers rather than management by exception by distributed personnel. The ability to manage a satellite by
exception within a distributed computing environment
where the magnitude of human attention required for
maintenance is much closer to ones rather than tens of operators, would significantly reduce life cycle cost of small
satellites and enable the deployment of large constellations and frequent scientific missions. The architecture
presented here provides an approach toward achieving
increased operational autonomy with stepwise advancement which removes much of the risk associated with less
flexible designs that target a specific level of autonomy.
More frequent missions will further drive automation,
increase commercial profitability, stimulate larger scale
production of space hardware and software, and help motivate the development of standardized reusable mission
operations systems. The resulting economies of scale
can enable a phenomena which greatly advanced terrestrial computing systems. These systems have evolved
from expensive, high maintenance mainframe computers
toward powerful desktop workstations that only require
occasional maintenance. While space systems are more
complex than terrestrial systems, to a great extent, the
same phenomena could be initiated by the small satellite
mission operations system architecture presented in this
paper.

ten operators, not including payload operators, and that
the number of operators scales linearly with the number of telemetry points to monitor (a large assumption),
then a constellation of hundreds of satellites would require thousands of operators and an inordinate operations budget. Furthermore, such systems are likely to
require many more operators due to non-linearly scaling workload associated with interactions and dependencies which can result in complex behavior and even unexpected emergent behavior. We hypothesize that automated methods of focusing attention, abstracting information, detecting events such as faults and opportunities,
reacting to detected events, and performing onboard automatic replanning could greatly decrease the workload
that is placed upon human operators, even with large volumes of telemetry at high data rates.
A common objection to automation is that automation
itself incorporates even more complexity into a system.
One significant flaw in this objection is that it ignores the
fact that humans add significant complexity and unpredictability to the behavior of an overall system when human and computer interaction is considered. Functions
allocated to human operators may in some cases be performed far more optimally than with automation, but the
ability to predict performance is nearly impossible. Studies show that human operators are a source of faults, and
often faults due to human operators are difficult to trace
or resolve [10]. While it is true that automation does add
complexity to the system, this is simply a testing and validation problem. Automation of functions has the distinct
advantages that it can be validated, and is much more reliably scalable than systems which rely upon extensive
human-computer interaction at low levels of abstraction.

Operations Concept

A fundamental concept of the architecture presented
here is that development of automation leading toward
greater operational autonomy is stepwise, with incorporation of a testbed to continuously validate and revalidate the system as it is evolved. Therefore, automation
of tasks performed initially by humans who can bring significant common sense reasoning and cognitive abilities
to bear upon ill-defined problems, can be incorporated as
these tasks are better understood and when human cognitive skills have less payoff. As a given mission operations system is evolved toward greater overall autonomy
with proven automation, then the scalability of the overall
system is greatly increased since the requirements placed
upon the human operator to maintain the performance of
each subsystem are reliably decreased.

The scalability of mission operations without significant
automation is limited. Assuming that in the best case
scenario, a single small satellite would require a team of

Features of the mission operations system architecture proposed and explored in this paper which lead directly toward operator load reduction and system scala2
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bility include:

be automated to self-monitor and produce a single health,
and status word or indicator, then an order of magnitude
reduction is achieved. With implementation and validation of such localized self-monitoring applied across multiple subsystems with regression testing to identify faults
identifiable only at the systemic level as subsystems are
combined, the load of monitoring is reliably reduced by
an order of magnitude or more. A common problem with
automated detection is performance with respect to number of false alarms raised compared to probability of failure to detect an anomaly. This is a matter of tuning and
effectiveness of the methods chosen for a specific monitoring task. The ability to use the testbed to support tuning and method selection is therefore required.

1. Mission operations management by exception due
to:
(a) automated resource management,
(b) self-monitoring capability such that fault detection and reaction, or performance maintenance, is mostly autonomous,
(c) onboard automatic replanning, and
(d) command and control which may include
event driven self-commanding.
2. A hardware and software architecture that supports
continuous evolution of automation over mission
life cycles and across missions as well as migration
of automation from validation testbeds, to ground
systems, and to onboard systems.

Reactions to many detected faults are often benign.
For example, if the power draw of an instrument is
anomalous, and the instrument is in a calibration mode
during a non-critical phase of the mission with respect
to science data acquisition, then safing the system by
switching off the instrument is a straightforward flight
rule that is simply automated. The inclusion of a rulebased system allows for such flight rules to be easily captured with rules that include modal and contextual logic
along with detection layer decision boundary logic. For
example, the identification of safing flight rules would
be a first level of reaction automation based upon the
detection layer. The only real danger of such fail-safe
automation is that false alarms which cause the system
to be spuriously safed lead to unnecessary opportunity
loss and reduction in overall performance. This is why
tuning and validation of the detection layer is so important. More complex reaction automations include resource management, scheduling, and performance maintenance despite faults and system degradation. By automating the simplest, most detectable and highest frequency event-reaction pairs, the telemetry monitoring
and commanding load associated with mission performance maintenance is reduced.

( 3. Ability to quickly incorporate new microprocessors, bus architectures, and peripherals into spacecraft embedded systems.
4. Scalability at the level of distributed ground stations, computing environments and constellations
of spacecraft.
5. Scalability of onboard microprocessors to multiprocessor systems to support redundancy and distribution of processor load associated with reasonably independent subsystems and payloads.
6. Incorporation of standardized reusable open systems software for ground and embedded systems
with many of the application specific functions incorporated into a more generic mission operations
extensible and modular kernel.
7. Availability of distributed softwarelhardware
mixed testbeds where "virtual spacecraft" can be
configured and used with the ability to simulate
and inject faults for testing throughout mission life
cycles.

While detection to reaction linking can reduce human
operational load by an order of magnitude alone, automatic replanning can further reduce the load. In fact, replanning is really a very highly automated type of reaction, One of the significant leverages of this architecture is that automated planning and replanning can be
built upon the automated reaction rules and with constraints (which also may be applied to human interfaces
to control human computer interaction faults) which can
be used as the kernel of the automatic planning system, The rules tied to the detection layer can be used
to trigger replanning which can use constraints with well
proven planning and scheduling algorithms to generate

8. Inclusion of security protocols such that the most
appropriate distributed resources and qualified personnel can be securely and cost effectively applied
to a mission on a demand basis.
The mission operations management by exception
achievable with this architecture can lead to an order of
magnitude reduction in human attention required. For example, in the case of telemetry monitoring and fault detection, if a subsystem which includes tens of sensors can

3

command sequences and perhaps even additional rules
and constraints. Onboard planning has the greatest automation leverage and risk, but with the systematic approach of achieving higher levels of automation proposed
here and supported by the proposed architecture, the risk
is greatly mitigated. With the detection and reaction layers of automation, an order of magnitude reduction in
work load may be achieved, and with automatic planning
based upon these layers, further orders of magnitude reduction can be achieved leading to very high level management by exception of a mission.

7. Development environment for simulations and
mixed hardware/software testbedding with the
ability to simulate faults.
8. Distributed ground and embedded system data
management schema.

Hardware System
In order to migrate spacecraft control to the flight system,
the flight hardware must be .::ble to support the increased
software demands that increasing levels of automation
and autonomy require. Providing a flight computer capable of heavy processing loads has previously been impossible because of the reliance on radiation-hardened
processors which typically are older, less capable technologies. The high cost and long lead times of space
rated electronics have discouraged the incorporation of
newer technologies as they become available, contributing to the lagging processing power prevalent in spacecraft computers.

System Description
The next generation small satellite mission operations
system includes a hardware bus archit~cture which, much
like today's desktop workstations, would allow multiple
processors, multiple peripherals, and payloads conforming to industry standard bus interfaces to be quickly integrated for a given mission. This hardware scalability is
key to the software required to support the mission operations concept presented here. Such a bus architecture
will enable redundancy and scalability, which will accommodate variations in subsystem and payload processing requirements, and will allow the addition of computing power as needed to enable much more onboard processing than is typical of traditional spacecraft computing
systems.
The software system architecture proposed enables
distribution of functions within the ground computing
environment and between the space and ground segments of the overall computing environment. The major systems software functions within this end-to-end distributed computing environment include:

Commercial parts By shifting from the conventional
frame of thought and utilizing commercial hardware and
software elements which are readily accessible and reI.atively inexpensive, a design can take advantage of the
high throughput and capabilities of current technologies.
In addition, by allowing the use of commercial technologies in system design, the system designer can incorporate the use of commercial standards, thus providing a
system architecture which is scalable, reusable and easily upgradable. The lower cost associated with commercial grade electronics allows migration of a flight design
to newer, increasingly capable technologies as they become available. In addition, the lower cost may also permit the construction of several flight testbed systems, allowing development and testing of ideas to occur in parallel. Of course, when using commercial components, potential problems associated with the space flight environment must be overcome [11,12, 13].
As with any spacecraft, the hardware must be designed to withstand the harsh conditions associated with
launch. This is of particular interest when designing a
scalable system using off-the-shelf computer hardware,
as most commercial environments are not as physically
stressful as a launch vehicle and as a result, the computer
boards are not designed with the same stress, vibration,
shock, and temperature loads in mind. Special construction techniques should be used during board manufacture
to provide the mechanical support necessary to survive
the rigorous launch conditions. These techniques should
include methods for supporting the board to minimize

1. Real-time operating system with an extensible and
configurable kernel.
2. Digital signal based behavioral and model deviation based fault detection.
3. Rule-based command and control for linking event
detection to automated reactions.
4. Automatic planning system with "anytime" algorithms.
5. Internetworking between space segment and
ground segment computers.
6. Transparent software and/or hardware based security protocols.
4
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vibration and flexing, and specifying connector designs
which are tolerant of these launch conditions. Maintaining the operating temperature limits of commercial components may place an added burden on the spacecraft
thermal subsystem.
Outgassing of the electronics packaging can be a
problem when using commercial parts. If outgassing can
damage flight system components such as science instrument optics, the use of commercial components may require the use of hermetically sealed enclosures to protect
the vulnerable elements.
The radiation environment to which the electronies
will be exposed must be analyzed. Certain missions,
particularly those of short duration, may experience low
total-dose radiation environments which can be easily
mitigated by use of shielding. Single event latchups and
upsets may be mitigated by utilizing various hardware
and software techniques and by incorporating redundant
hardware, the added cost of which will in most cases be
much less than the cost of radiation hardened circuits. Of
course, as in any flight system design, the added weight,
volume, and power requirements of the redundant circuitry must be considered.
Some missions may have specific mission requirements which preclude the use of commercial parts. However, the economies of scale provided by the increased
numbers of flights enabled by the proposed reusable architecture will provide increased availability of lower
cost, high performance space rated electronics suitable
for these missions.

In addition, to provide the performance that widely
varying mission requirements demand, the hardware may
support scalability by incorporating additional features
including:

1. Direct memory access (DMA) support to allow
high speed transfers between system peripherals
and memory.
2. Use of appropriate standards such as VMEbus to
allow easy incorporation of additional interfaces
and multi-processing capability, which can also allow redundancy to protect against a single processor failure.
3. Support for increasingly compact, inexpensive,
and power-thrifty memory elements such as solid
state disks and standards such as PCMCIA to allow
a system to contain far more data storage capability
than was previously possible.
4. Support for reusability and reconfigurability; an
example being Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGA's) used as 110 interfaces.
5. Network support, so that if required, communication between multiple computers in the same
spacecraft or within a constellation may use
eommercial network protocol standards such as
TCPJIP.

Fuuctiouality The hardware must support the various
demands of increasing levels of automation by providing
basic functionality including:

By providing the ability to reuse existing hardware designs merely by upgrading to the current technology, less
time is spent developing and maintaining mission operations software specific to each hardware configuration,
thus maximizing the benefits of software reuse.

I. Sufficient processing ability for increased software

loads.
2. Interrupt support and hardware timers, necessary
for real-time operating system support.
3. Sufficient memory, processing power, and system
resources to support mission goals.

Software System

4. Adequate communications bandwidth to support
the transfer of data and commands between the
ground system and flight system.

As described, the software system will include eight
m'\ior components to be integrated within an open distributed computing environment. The major emphasis
is on scalability so that common systems software can
be used throughout the distributed system of ground and
space segment computers with tailorability to special segment requirements.

5. Non-volatile memory for storage of code updates
and system configuration parameters.
6. Sufficient 110 capability, including both adequate
transfer rate and numbers and types of channels.

5

Real-Time Operating System Layer The RTOS
(Real-Time Operating System) includes an extensible
and configurable kernel such that common kernel software can be incorporated within embedded systems in
the space segment and within the ground segment to
the greatest extent possible. Current work on RT-Mach,
RTEMS, and many other open operating systems which
support real-time scheduling can be used to provide this
functionality. These operating systems can be used to
easily integrate the other major functional layers of this
architecture with a common kernel layer that provides
standardized abstractions of the processors and hardware
interfaces incorporated in the overall system.
The generality of an RTOS in comparison to an application specific executive does mean that greater overhead is placed upon task management for a given application, but it also means greater flexibility, quicker development, and better scalability and ability to support the
automation layers of the overall system such as detection
and rule-based reaction. For example, the ability to meet
deadlines within a real-time system with rule-based inferencing can be greatly simplified by an RTOS scheduler
which provides methods to balance rule-based inferencing with other system processing and critical processing
with hard deadlines. The reliability of real-time systems
incorporating complicated inferencing and planning algorithms can be greatly increased with proven scheduling
algorithms [8, 9].

significant problem with the use of such automated detection systems is the "tuning" required to achieve beneficial automation for any given monitoring application.
This software layer is tunable in tenns of decision boundaries, methods, and input transformation fidelity such that
overall system detection performance can be optimized
in terms of mission requirements for detection performance (false alarms and probability of missed faults). A
direct interface between the fault detection layer and the
command and control layer should provide that capability to link reactions to detection. This detection reaction linking is fundamental to automation and overall autonomy. Finally, the detection must be context-sensitive
such that false alarms which might be raised otherwise
due to commands, sequences, and planned mode changes
do not raise false alanns leading to unnecessary system
load and possibly detrimental incorrect reactions.
In general, fault and event detection methods include:
limit sensing, difference-based reasoning, causal reasoning (changes in relationships), reference model deviation,
trending analysis, frequency domain entropy-based reasoning, configuration and sequence discrepancy analysis, and many other logical and statistical modeling methods. Difference-based reasoning methods such as distance measures are to be incorporated which include both
causal distances (changes in relationships) and simple
distances (changes in behavior) [5, 7]. Traditional statistical modeling methods for trending including methods such as ARMA (Autoregression Moving Average)
and methods for modal modeling such as linear mixture
models will be incorporated and used as benchmarks. Finally, the applicability of ANN (Artificial Neural Networks) as non-linear mixture deviation models and classifiers of time series transformed input is being considered for incorporation.

Digital Sensor Based Event Detection Layer This
system integrates advanced technologies for digital sensor based fault and event detection, context-based t:easoning, hierarchical monitor performance tuning, intelligent
monitor-to-action linking, and human computer interfaces. Such functionality is required to enable other autonomy enabling functions such as fault handling, goaloriented self commanding, automatic replanning, and resource management. This proposal includes enhancements to the specific technologies and methods for applying the technologies in order to provide proven, reliable
monitoring automation. The integrated system supports
self monitoring in distributed systems, a range of possible human attention, and provides for migration of monitoring between segments of a scalable distributed system. Finally, the system has been designed to simplify
the tuning and application of the self monitoring system
to a range of systems and missions.
This digital signal based behavioral and model deviation based event and fault detection is a data processing
function that will be distributable between the ground and
space segments in this proposed architecture. The most

One of the problems associated with incorporating a
large number of detection methods is how to determine
when to apply a particular method or a combination of
methods to provide the best detection performance. As
previously noted, detection methods available include a
variety of approaches that can be applied to the sensor
time and/or frequency domain output. A support tool for
analyzing detection method applicability to specific failure modes will be incorporated in the system. This tool
will provide evaluation of the best single method or combination of methods for a specific monitoring application
based upon testbed simulation and injection of software
and hardware simulated faults into nominal simulations.
Monitors can be related in a hierarchy such that specific sensor monitors can be grouped by component,
subsystem, and system. This approach supports mon6
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itor tuning at all levels as well as diagnosis and tracing. The structure and the associated relationships would
also provide valuable infonnation that could be used
by an embedded expert system for autonomous tracing,
or a ground based object-oriented database management
schema andlor expert system to support diagnosis and
tracing that cannot be handled completely autonomously.
Finally, this is also key to highly abstracted monitoring
since a hierarchical structure of fault information can be
directly associated with this monitor structure.

set of combined detection methods that provide the best
overall hit rate with the lowest false alarm rate for a given
monitor. For example, the optimization tool can determine detection method decision boundary synergism for
failure mode sets. The ability to look at individual monitor perfomlance and translate this into system level perfonnance is implemented by making use of the monitor
hierarchy such that individual monitor, subsystem, and
system level monitoring perfonnance can be evaluated
and tuned. The proposed monitor performance tuning
methods and tools include:

The occurrence of false alanns and false opportunities will be minimized with context-based reasoning. For
example, simple mode changes and associated nominal
behavior and relational changes can cause false alarms
unless the context of the mode change is incorporated
into the monitor. Multiple levels of context-based reasoning can be supported with the proposed system, including
simple reasoning local to the monitor based upon related
sensor values, global information such as subsystem or
system mode infonnation provided by external context,
and high level rule-based constraints based upon mission
and systems engineering parameters. Where this context
reasoning is perfonned depends upon the time criticality
of the monitor and the complexity of the context-based
reasoning required to provide appropriate monitor performance with respect to detection and false alanns.

1. A decision boundary tuning method for controlling monitor performance such that the tradeoff between detection sensitivity and the number of false
alarms raised for each individual monitor can be
optimized.
2. A hierarchical tuning method that will detennine
the overall system expected alarm rate, false alann
rate, and possibility of failure to detect a true fault
based upon performance of lower levels.
3. A tuning tool which will automate the bottom-up
and top-down tuning approaches of items 1 and 2
above so that the self monitoring system can be optimized to meet overall monitoring goals.

Key perfonnance measures of automated monitoring
are the false alarm rate and the missed fault rate. While
monitor perfonnance is tied to hardware design parameters such as sampling frequency and sensor placement,
given a set of samples, the monitoring method performance can be analyzed and tuned. For example, automated fault monitoring is in fact a classification problem, even when faults themselves are not classified, since
the fundamental classes are nominal and anomalous. According to the theory of ROC (Receiver Operator Curves)
any given classification scheme will result in a tradeoff
between the "hit rate" and the "false alann rate" for a
given input sample set. In the case of fault detection, the
hit rate is the percentage of correctly classified anomalous samples and the false alarm rate is number of nominal samples incorrectly classified. The ROC tradeoff
is based upon imperfections in the monitoring method,
(a perfect monitor would correctly classify all samples
and therefore raise no false alarms and have a perfect hit
rate). The placement of monitor decision boundaries detennines where a monitor is on its ROC, and therefore the
current tradeoff between hit rate and false alarms can be
tuned for a specific detection method.

4. Application of testbed and software simulations,
which provide controlled fault injection, to automated fault detection system tuning (items 1, 2,
and 3 above).
5. Incorporation of frequency domain automated binning features.
6. Incorporation of confusion matrix analysis and
other tuning features.
The self monitoring system does not preclude human
monitoring, but does minimize it by elevating the monitoring to a high level. The height of the level can be
specified according to mission objectives and the ability
to automate monitoring and to link detection with intelligent reactions. At the highest level, the health of the
overall system would simply be related to a human operator by a green, yellow, or red indication of missioh status. The automated monitoring focuses operator attention
only on problems which cannot be handled autonomously
or those where operator concurrence is desired (e.g. a red
condition). This approach will be integrated with the hierarchy of monitors proposed in the self monitoring system.

This method of decision boundary tuning can be used
to optimize monitor perfonnance with an individual or
7

Rule-based Command and Control Layer The command and control system will be a layer of systems software above the RTOS kernel that supports the specification of mission operations rules, constraints, sequences
and high-level commands. This command and control
layer should include an API (Application Programmer's
Interface) such that it can be interfaced with sophisticated
user interface, interprocess communication, data management, and automation software in the ground segment
as well as with reusable device drivers, data management,
fault detection, and communications software to be incorporated in the space segment. The rule-based command
and control is key for providing a framework for evolving automation, and thus overall operational autonomy,
toward higher and higher levels. Simple rules for safing
in the onboard segment can be augmented with more "intelligent" rules to maximize performance and minimize
human operational attention required as a mission progresses and over a range of related missions. Careful design of such systems to enable them to be embedded and
to be distributed is required, but this has been done successfully [8, 14].

Distributed Systems Internetworking Internetworking between space segment and ground segment computers will likely include parallel stacks at the ground entry point, but these parallel stacks should provide reliable data transport with transparent protocol conversion
at the lowest layers possible. Furthermore, space communications protocols have special requirements based
upon limited bandwidth and many other characteristics
of space segment links not in common with ground segment networks and have traditionally only been point to
point. However, the emergence of constellations, optical
intersatellite links, and many other developments means
that the need for space segment protocols with internetworking capabilities is more likely in future small satellites. Since the need for various standardized communications protocols is likely to continue to vary greatly for
future small sate11ite systems, the proposed next generation small satellite operations system should include a
message passing API which enables the use of different
protocol stacks and the integration of interprocess communications within a heterogeneous system.
Currently, most mission operations teams are physically co-located and include constant monitoring. The
automation framework proposed here will allow mission
operations with management by exception. In order to
actually realize cost savings associated with management
by exception, yet still provide a system to support complex anomaly resolution, the system must include the capability to support distributed mission operations teams.
Aside from the distributed computing environment described here which underpins this overall system, the
ability to incorporate resources and individuals that are
widely distributed is greatly enhanced with the ability to
use public networks. The problem with public networks
is security. Transparent software andlor hardware based
security protocols can be incorporated into the data transport associated with command and control and data distribution such that public networks can be used. Data transport sub-layer encryption tied to system service client authentication is used to provide reasonable levels of security within a public network [15, 16],

Automatic Planning and Scheduling Automated
planning and scheduling is incorporated in the ground
segment simply to optimize the use of resources and
schedule events based upon opportunities and events.
Traditionally this function is done as a batch operation
rather than a real-time function. Predetermined plans are
then executed on board as RTOS scheduled sequences.
This system will include the capability to distribute planning between the ground and space segment such that
automatic onboard replanning can enable a more autonomous spacecraft to meet higher level objectives in
spite of system performance degradation (faults) and unexpected events. This requires a direct interface between
the fault detection layer, the command and control layer,
the RTOS scheduler, and the automatic planning system software. The extent to which the onboard planning
system can replan based upon goal specifications is tailorable, but the ability to incorporate goals into plans,
thus raising the level of abstraction of a plan from an explicit sequence to a more goal-oriented plan is to be standardized [17, 18]. Optimizing algorithms for resource
management and scheduling must be "anytime" such that
real-time operating system deadlines can be met. Finally,
the automatic planning system must interface with the
RTOS resource management kernel functions for management of standard resource types such as consumable
resources, serially reusable exclusive access resources,
etc.

Automation and Autonomy Testbed Automation
must be carefully validated before it can lead to a more
operable autonomous system. The careful integration
of automated functions is considered to be fundamental
to the achievement of operational autonomy. Without
significant testing, automation may reduce performance
andlor operability, actually leading to less autonomy and
even more significant human attention requirements. In
addition to traditional software engineering methods, a
8
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development environment for simulations and mixed
hardware/software testbedding with the ability to support
injection of simulated faults, is fundamental to the successful application of automation. The use of a testbed
to build a virtual spacecraft in order to be used as an automation testbed with the ability to migrate automation
proven in the testbed will help ensure that automation
does in fact lead to increased operability. For example,
a fault detection and reaction automation can be prototyped, tuned, and tested in the testbed, then migrated to
the ground operations computers for further testing and
operator concurrence, followed by migration onboard
once the automation is "trusted."

storing all down-linked data to a SCSI digital audio tape
(DAT) drive. Remote connection support to the Colorado
Space Grant College will be provided via an Internet connection and a backup high-speed modem link.
Sun SPARCstation 20, SPARCstation 10, and SGI
machines will be used at the Colorado Space Grant College to command and control the payload and to process
data received from the flight system.
The flight system consists of a Motorola IDP embedded development board tltilizing a Motorola 68EC040
microprocessor, three science instruments, and a SCSI
DAT drive which will provide primary flight system data
archivaL
The payload processor is responsible for controlling the three science instruments and for communicating with ground control through NASA communication
links. During early prototyping, this processor communicates directly with the Sun SPARCstation 20 slated to
perform the responsibilities of the ground control workstation to be located at Goddard during the Shuttle flight.

Data Management The final software function important to the overall operations concept is distributed
ground and embedded system data management. Data
stored within the distributed system of ground computers should be accessible from any distributed node. Further, data stored within the distributed space segment
should be transported to the ground segment and stored at
ground entry points as transparently and reliably as possible. Finally, the ability to distribute information, retrieve
it transparently within a distributed system and to automate the retrieval of information most pertinent to management tasks is important. Often an understated problem of mission operations is simply the overhead of retrieving information required to support anomaly resolution, planning, and other human activities.

Software components The prototype include software
in both the flight system and the ground system:
•UNIX I This non-real-time operating system is used as
the common platform supporting the software packages
utilized in the ground system.

I RTEMS I The Real-Time Executive for Military Systems is being used in the flight system to schedule processes and manage computer resources. RTEMS was developed by On-Line Applications Research Corporation
under contract to the Research, Development, and Engineering Center of the U.S. Army Missile Command and
is provided as a technology transfer/dual use service to
individuals and companies having a need for this product. RTEMS is supported and is freely available via the
Internetl .
ISCL I The Spacecraft Command Language, a commercial command and control software package developed
by Interface and Control Systems, is being used both
in the payload and in the ground system. SCL scripts
and functions can be used to perform certain activities.
SCL constraints can be used to prevent certain commands
from being executed when a condition exists in the system that could adversely affect mission success if the
command is actually executed. SCL rules can be used to
execute scripts and functions based on the current value
of relevant SCL database items. Communication protocols can be defined in SCL so that the flight software can
communicate with the subsystem hardware via custom

Prototype System
In order to test some of the concepts presented in this paper, a prototype system has been developed by students
and faculty of the Colorado Space Grant College at the
University of Colorado at Boulder. This prototype consists of an October 1997 manifested Space Shuttle Hitchhiker payload along with associated ground software and
hardware.
Hardware Components The prototype includes
equipment to be located at three different physical locations: the flight system to be located on the Space Shuttle,
the ground support equipment to be located at Goddard
Space Flight Center, and the central command equipment
located at the Colorado Space Grant College.
A Sun SPARCstation 20 will serve as the ground support equipment and will be directly connected to NASA's
communication channels. This machine will also serve as
the primary ground system information archival unit by
1 http://lancelot.gcs.redstone.anny.millrg4lrtems.html
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drivers while the ground system software elements distributed between machines can communicate using standard techniques such as sockets.

test new command software using the LabVIEW hardware simulation. Once the code is validated, it will then
be migrated to the embedded system on the shuttle.

ISammi I

I021

This commercial graphical user interface
(GUI) building tool is utilized to generate displays for
the mission operations team. These displays are organized in a hierarchical fashion and allow a mission controller access to detailed information about subsystem
performance and design. Color coding of display elements is used to signify system states (green=nominal,
yellow=warning, red=critical).

This commercial object oriented database is being used to maintain a history of SCL database values, to
manage the configuration of source code and data, as well
as to store design and operations documents.

IHTML I

The HyperText Markup Language is being
used to create World Wide Web pages 2 which document
prototype design details. This information is used during the development stage to distribute design details between subsystem engineers, and will be used by mission operations personnel during training and for reference during the flight. Web browsers such as Netscape
and Mosaic are currently being used to access these Web
pages.

ISELMON I

This Selective Monitoring tool developed
at JPL will be used to process sensor output and automatically trigger SCL rules based upon SELMON outputs,
decision boundary logic, and contextual logic. SELMON
will be used in both ground and flight systems.
The prototype system integrates detection methods
with the SCL forward-chaining rule-based system so that
fault alarms and detected opportunities can be linked to
intelligent reactions. The integration of SELMON monitoring with SCL has been implemented both with shared
memory and message passing such that this monitor-toaction linking can be used locally or for actions to be
taken anywhere within a distributed system.

IC/C++ I

Device drivers, networking and test code are
being developed in C and C++ and are compiled using the
freely available gcc and g++ compilers.

Conclusions
Concepts for an architecture providing a means for controlling a small spacecraft using a minimum of personnel have been discussed. By utilizing reusable hardware
and software, industry standards, and software which
enhances autonomous operation, the "smaller, faster,
cheaper" philosophy is adhered to, thus providing an architectural framework around which future designs may
be molded. With adequate flight system processing
power and software design, it should be possible to improve spacecraft performance while simultaneously reducing the number of mission operations support personnel by at least an order of magnitude. The architecture
will be demonstrated and the operations personnel reduction hypothesis tested on an October 1997 Space Shuttle
Hitchhiker payload.

IPlan-It nJ

A ground system planning and scheduling
tool developed at JPL, Plan-It II will be used to aide in
the mission sequencing. Current development efforts include modifying Plan-It II to allow automatic generation
of SCL scripts, rules, and constraints.

ITCPIIP I

The Transport Control Protocol layered on
the Internet Protocol provides reliable data transport between the computers comprising the ground system.

IKerberos I

Security is incorporated in the networking
software by utilizing the Kerberos package developed at
MIT.
Lab VIEW I Laboratory Virtual Instrumentation Engineering Workbench is a commercial tool which is being
used to simulate the spacecraft subsystems during initial
development and will also be used during flight to test
software on the ground before it is migrated to the flight
system. As each subsystem design progresses, its functionality is imitated in LabVIEW. Utilizing a sockets connection, SCL queries LabVIEW for the current state of
each SUbsystem, much like it will be utilized to query the
real instruments during flight. As each subsystem is prototyped, its hardware replaces its respective LabVIEW
simulation, until at last the complete spacecraft is integrated. During flight, the ground system software will

I
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